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A DAY IN THE LIFE OF TORT LAW
Douglas H. Cook*
What would one day's worth of tort law look like? We usually
receive our doses of the law in measures other than per diem: by
the case, by the brief, by the article, or by the treatise. There is, of
course, a unity in each of those units; each one collects only those
authorities that bear upon certain focused aspects of the law. For
example, an appellate brief or a law review article is often a com-
pendium of cases dealing within a narrow topical range, cases drawn
from a span of many different days, years, or even decades. One
way to view the development of the common-law subjects, then, is
to envision various lines or streams of cases, sometimes guided in
their courses by statutory tributaries, flowing and joining into wide
rivers: contract law, property law-or tort law.
But the law also grows by accretion. Each day, in courts across
the nation, another layer is added to the law of torts. In some ways,
as a construct, this is the antithesis of how we have learned to view
the law. If a casebook is the order of the tort law, with two proxi-
mate cause cases from different eras neatly paired,' then a single
day represents the glorious chaos of tort: an auto accident in Penn-
sylvania, a products liability suit in Utah, a medical malpractice case
in Connecticut. What might a one-day slice of American tort law
reveal? I set out to find out.
My quest would be artistic, not statistic. To construct the most
accurate picture possible of one tort day would require a painstak-
ing assembling of trial court records from thousands of local and
county courthouses in all fifty states: a daunting task, and arguably
not worth the mileage or postage. A more feasible approach is
made possible by the ready availability of computerized searches in
legal opinion databases. It is, of course, now possible to search for
and compile all court opinions promulgated on a single, specific
date, and to narrow the search further to a single area of law.
Therefore, using the two best known computerized legal research
services, I set out to discover one day's worth of torts opinions, from
the first light of dawn in Maine to the last rays on some Pacific coast
courthouse.
* Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law; B.A., Miami
University; J.D., The Ohio State University College of Law.
1. See, eg., PROSSER, WVADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERLA.LtS ON
TORTS 290-95 (John NV. Wade et al. eds., 9th ed. 1994) (Ryan v. New York Central
R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866), followed by Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984)).
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I. THE SEARCH
First, I had to decide which date to pick. I pursued a number of
criteria. I wanted a day when a fair representative sample2 of
American courts were releasing tort-law opinions. It had to be re-
cent enough that it could stand for a view of today's tort law. On
the other hand, enough time should have passed so that the day's
opinions could gel a little, getting past motions for reconsideration
and withdrawal, and into official reporters where possible. Summer
would not do-too many courts not in session. Same for holiday
seasons. For similar reasons, I thought that Mondays and Fridays
might also be problematic. Factoring in all of the above, and with a
good dose of random dart throwing, I chose Thursday, October 19,
1995. A preliminary search indicated what seemed to be a healthy
number of tort opinions on that date. A similar search of a few
nearby dates satisfied me that October 19 was fairly typical in its
volume of opinions. Other than that process, it was truly a random
choice. I did not, for example, read torts opinions from that date or
any other date, with an eye toward choosing a day with interesting
cases. That would have been cheating. It also proved to be unnec-
essary, as will appear later.
There is, of course, an artifice to collecting all the cases bearing a
single date. Some opinions are dated with an indication that the
case was "decided" on that day.3 The reality, especially where an
appellate court is involved, is that the given date usually represents
the day the opinion is announced or released, having been actually
decided some time earlier. Other cases refer to the date the opinion
was "filed." 4 Still others more accurately report the "date of an-
nouncement of decision."'5 The point is, there is an admitted arbi-
trariness to collecting all opinions dated October 19, 1995. Still,
October 19 represents the day that all these opinions were added to
the body of the tort law.
The inception of the search itself was relatively simple. Restrict-
ing it to October 19, 1995, I searched for all opinions in which there
appeared at least one of the following tort terms (or any related
form thereof6): tort, negligence, battery, assault, false imprison-
ment, trespass, conversion, emotional distress, strict liability, prod-
uct(s) liability, nuisance, slander, libel, defamation, invasion of
2. I am not a statistician, but I think I know enough to understand that what I
have done does not represent a statistically significant sample. It is, as I said before,
more appropriately viewed as an artistic endeavor.
3. E.g., Hatch v. Maine Tank Co., 666 A.2d 90, 90 (Me. 1995).
4. E.g., Hayes v. City of Chicago Police Dep't, No. 95 C 1459, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15698 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1995).
5. E.g., Suveges v. James, No. 68533, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4622 (Oct. 19,
1995).
6. For example, the root word, "tort," with an expander symbol ("tort!") will find
cases containing the words tort, torts, tortious, and tortfeasor.
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privacy, bad faith, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, punitive
damages, fraud, and misrepresentation. After thereby obtaining
well over one hundred cases, a winnowing process began. First, I
had to eliminate cases in which one of the search terms had ap-
peared by coincidence, in a context that had nothing to do with tort
law. For example, in Flamer v. State,7 the word "negligence" ap-
peared, but in the context of "criminal negligence" in a habeas
corpus case.' Similarly, Mangum v. Hargett9 referred to criminal as-
sault, not the common-law tort of assault.'"
Sometimes it was difficult to decide whether the case was really a
tort case. Should it be considered a tort case when it was neither
brought as a tort case, nor decided as a tort case, but discussed at
length the substantive law of torts? An example is City Bank &
Trust Co. v. Vann (In re Vann)." Edwin Vann had failed to disclose
to his lender bank that there had been a deterioration in his finan-
cial condition after application, but before the loan closed.12 After
Vann filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bank sought to avoid dis-
charge of the debt, on the basis that the credit had been obtained by
"fraud," as that term was used in section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 3 In evaluating what standard of reliance was required
as an element of fraud in this statutory context, the Eleventh Circuit
was faced with a split among sister circuits: some required reason-
able reliance, some "justifiable" reliance, some actual reliance."4 To
answer the question, the court turned to, and followed, the common
law of torts. The court noted that both the Restatement 5 and the
Prosser hornbook"6 adopt a "justifiable reliance" standard for
fraud.' 7 The court likewise adopted that standard for bankruptcy
purposes, then went on to discuss how the common law defines jus-
tifiable reliance: "Justifiable reliance is gauged by 'an individual
standard of the plaintiffs own capacity and the knowledge which he
has, or which may fairly be charged against him from the facts
within his observation in the light of his individual case."" 8 Vann is
7. 68 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 1995).
8. Id. at 741 n3.
9. 67 F.3d 80 (5th Cir. 1995).
10. Id. at 81 n.1.
11. 67 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1995).
12. Id. at 279. The loan documents contained representations that there had
been no such changes. Id.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1988).
14. In re Vann, 67 F.3d at 280. The United States Supreme Court has now re-
solved the split. Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437,446 (1995) (holding that fraud excep-
tion to discharge requires justifiable, not reasonable, reliance).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977).
16. NV. PAGE KEETON ET At.., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE L W OF TORTS
§ 108, at 749 (5th ed. 1984).
17. In re Vann, 67 F.3d at 283.
18. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting KEETON ET At-, supra note 16, at 751).
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thus a bankruptcy case, but with significant tort substance.' 9 I de-
cided that this placed it within the realm of "tort cases" decided on
October 19, 1995.
The search found several cases20 brought as civil rights actions
under section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act."' Some scholars
consider the section 1983 action to be a kind of "constitutional
tort."'  I decided, however, not to include cases based solely on sec-
tion 1983, because of their exclusive focus on federal statutory and
constitutional issues, rather than on tort law. I did, of course, in-
clude those civil rights cases that alleged pendent state-law tort
claims.'
On the other hand, New Connecticut Bank & Trust v. Mussa (In re
Cleveland Tankers, Inc.)2 also involved a federal statutory cause of
action, but I included it because of its extensive adoption (and dis-
cussion) of substantive tort principles. The case was brought under
the Limited Liability Act,25 and arose out of a ship explosion on the
Saginaw River. Pursuant to admiralty principles, the district court
assigned fifty percent of the fault to one defendant, and twenty-five
percent each to two other defendants.26 The Sixth Circuit's opinion
discusses tort-related issues such as proximate cause, standards of
care, and apportionment of fault.2 7
Another challenge with regard to what cases to include involved
those areas of the law that flirt around the edges of tort law, or that
provide remedies similar to (or in lieu of) tort law. For example,
statutory workers' compensation regimes provide compensation to
employees injured on the job.28 The compensation replaces what
might otherwise be a tort recovery, and the former precludes the
latter.2 9 As a general rule, I have not included workers' compensa-
tion cases in my survey of tort cases from October 19, 1995,
although one exception is Danielson v. Larsen Co.3" In that case,
19. For another October 19 bankruptcy case dealing with an underlying tort
cause of action, see American General Finance v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 187 B.R. 736
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (conversion).
20. E.g., Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 1995).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
22. See, e.g., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ToRTs, supra note 1, at 985-95 (including section 1983 cases). See also Memphis
Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1986) (noting that a viola-
tion of section 1983 rights creates a species of constitutional tort liability).
23. E.g., Franklin v. Village of Riverdale, No. 94 C 3983, 1995 WL 616678 (N.D.
Il1. Oct. 19, 1995) (discussing pendent state law claims of assault, battery, and mali-
cious prosecution).
24. 67 F.3d 1200 (6th Cir. 1995).
25. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1994).
26. In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 67 F.3d at 1204.
27. Id. at 1204-08.
28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 80, at 568.
29. Id.
30. 541 N.W.2d 507 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
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the plaintiff (who had been struck by a car while working by the
road) tried to break out of the workers' compensation system and
into the tort system to sue his employer for negligence. He argued
that his employer's maintenance of a liability policy, separate from
the workers' compensation coverage, constituted a waiver of the
statutory exclusive remedy provision.31 The court held, however,
that such a waiver would be found only if express language in the
other insurance policy so indicated.32 In this case, far from contain-
ing an express waiver, the other policy featured a specific provision
excluding coverage for damages otherwise covered by workers'
compensation.33 Accordingly, the court precluded the injured em-
ployee from venturing into the tort system1 Because the case helps
define the outer boundaries of the law of torts, I considered it to be
a part of the October 19 package.35
I did not count Gordon v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Insurance Co.36
as a tort case. Gordon was injured in a car-motorcycle collision.
The driver of the motorcycle (upon which Gordon was a passenger)
was apparently negligent, but uninsured, so no tort claim was pur-
sued. Rather, Gordon filed an uninsured motorist claim.37 In such
a case, the uninsured motorist insurance coverage can substitute for
a tort recovery, but as a matter of contract law, not tort law. The
opinion dealt with whether the tort statute of limitations would ap-
ply, as opposed to the longer contract statute of limitations. The
court held that the latter applied.38 The opinion appeared in my
searches because of its use of the words "tort" and "tortfeasor" in
relation to the statute of limitations issue.39
31. Id at 509.
32. Id. at 510.
33. Id
34. Id. at 511.
35. Wo other October 19 cases also involved drawing the boundary between tort
and workers' compensation. In Pace v. Cummins Engine Co., 905 P.2d 303 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995), the court held that the workers' compensation statute precluded the
plaintiff's negligence suit under Utah's "loaned employee doctrine." Id. at 311. And
in McCoy v. Zahniser Graphics, Inc., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), the
court construed a California statute allowing injured workers to bring tort actions
when the injury is caused by a power press lacking a specific safety device. Id. at
872-73. I included one additional workers' compensation case, because it contained
some discussion of substantive tort rules. In Bellia v. General Motors Corp., No.
68489, 1995 WL 614509 (Ohio CL App. Oct. 19, 1995), the court observed: -The
definition of 'proximate cause' in the workers' compensation context is the same as
in the field of torts .... 'Proximate cause' is a happening or event which as a natural
and continuous sequence produces an injury without which the result would not
have occurred." Id. at *4.
36. 914 S.W.d 331 (Ky. 1995).
37. Id. at 331.
38. Id. at 333.
39. Id. passim.
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Other cases were close to the outer boundaries of tort law. One
court characterized an insurance bad faith claim as "part-contract
and part-tort: part-contract because such claims do not arise in the
absence of an insurance contract and part-tort because such claims
can be brought by third parties and result in awards of tort-like
damages. '40 The line between tort and contract was also at issue in
Foseid v. State Bank,4' a case exploring the potential for a tort of
bad faith breach of contract. This Wisconsin appellate opinion arose
in the context of the bank's contractual relationship with a mortga-
gor landowner. The court recognized that every contract carries
with it an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.42 In the
relationship between an insurer and an insured, breach of the good
faith covenant gives rise to an action in tort.43 But in every other
contract, bad faith breach is only viable as a contract action, not a
tort action: that is, the tort of bad faith "does not exist in Wisconsin
other than in certain cases involving insurance companies and their
insureds.""
II. THE RESULTS
After going through the process described above, I arrived at a
count of seventy-eight tort cases decided on October 19, 1995. The
cases and their citations are listed in the Appendix to this article.45
Tort cases on that date came from three federal circuit courts41 and
from nine federal district courts.47 The highest courts of Illinois,48
Kentucky, 49 Maine," Mississippi, 5' and Pennsylvania52 issued torts
40. Pen Coal Corp. v. William H. McGee & Co., 903 F. Supp. 980, 983 (S.D. W.
Va. 1995).
41. 541 N.W.2d 203 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
42. Id. at 211.
43. Id.
44. kIL
45. I resisted the temptation to create an extremely long and therefore poten-
tially impressive footnote listing all cases. I decided that the Appendix would be
more accessible.
46. Jacobs v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 67 F.3d 1219 (6th Cir. 1995); Strat-
meyer v. United States, 67 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1995); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Vann
(In re Vann), 67 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1995).
47. E.g., Bomboir v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 902 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. I11.
1995); Carbotrade SpA v. Bureau Veritas, 901 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Strick-
land v. Royal Lubricant Co., 911 F. Supp. 1460 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Johnson v. Greater
Southeast Community Hosp. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 140 (D.D.C. 1995); Flannagan v.
Bader, 905 F. Supp. 933 (D. Kan. 1995); Statia Terminals v. Huber Inc., Civ. A. No.
95-1633, 1995 WL 619775 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 1995); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist.,
904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Doe v. Dendrinos, No. 95-4471, 1995 WL
621567 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1995); Pen Coal Corp. v. William H. McGee & Co., 903 F.
Supp. 980 (S.D. W. Va. 1995).
48. E.g., Bubb v. Springfield Sch. Dist. 186, 657 N.E.2d 887 (I11. 1995).
49. E.g., Adams v. Miller, 908 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1995).
50. E.g., Hatch v. Maine Tank Co., 666 A.2d 90 (Me. 1995).
51. E.g., Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648 (Miss. 1995).
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opinions on October 19. Lower courts in those states, and in twelve
other states,53 also decided tort cases.
A review of the substantive theories of the cases reveals some
interesting features: of the seventy-eight cases, forty-eight of them
involved allegations of negligence. 54 I had always perceived as con-
ventional wisdom the truism that negligence dominates the tort
field; here was some (limited) empirical evidence. Also interesting
was the variety of other torts involved in the cases. In order of the
frequency with which they appeared in the cases,"5 the torts are: in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress 56 (seven cases); strict prod-
ucts liability' (six); defamation 8 (six); fraud 59 (five); battery60
(five); conversion 6' (four); negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress62 (four). Other torts that appeared occasionally (no more than
three times, but at least once) were interference with contract, bad
faith, trespass, nuisance, common-law strict liability, false imprison-
ment, invasion of privacy, interference with business relationships,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent misrepresenta-
tion, and assault: in all, twenty different torts in one day's worth of
tort opinions.
The cases arose in a variety of settings. Nine of the cases involved
automobile accidents.63 Only eight cases were products liability
52. E.g., Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176 (Pa. 1995).
53. E.g., Renz v. 33rd Dist. Agric. Assoc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 67 (Cal. CL App.
1995); Traunig v. Knutson Mortgage Corp., No. CV 95-0551598 S, 1995 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2942 (Conn. Super. CL Oct. 19, 1995); Reddick v. Carfield, 656 N.E.2d 518
(Ind. CL App. 1995); Oxley v. Sabine River Auth., 663 So. 2d 497 (La. Ct. App.
1995); Garcia v. Kusan, Inc., 655 N.E.2d 1290 (Mass. App. C. 1995); Dunn v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 909 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. CL App. 1995); Jacobo v. A.H.A. Gen. Con-
str., Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Lazzara v. Marc Glassman, Inc..
667 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio CL App. Oct. 19, 1995); Arnold v. Ford, No. 01-A-01-9505-
CV00203, 1995 WL 611280 (Tenn. Ct App. Oct. 19, 1995); Jamar v. Patterson, 910
S.WV.2d 118 (Tex. CL App. 1995); Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297
(Utah Ct. App. 1995); Foseid v. State Bank, 541 N.W.2d 203 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
54. I have again resisted the temptation to create a long and impressive footnote.
Any reader who wants to know which 48 cases these are can write to me, and I vill
be happy to provide that list.
55. Many of the cases involved allegations of several torts.
56. E.g., Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93 C 4397, 1995 WL 616685 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 19, 1995).
57. E.g., Jacobs v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 67 F.3d 1219 (6th Cir. 1995).
58. E.g., Goldsmith v. Polygram Diversified Ventures Inc., No. 94 CIV. 8888.
1995 WL 614560 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995).
59. E.g., Fisher Controls Int'l, Inc. v. Gibbons, 911 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995).
60. E.g., Childers v. A.S., 909 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. CL App. 1995).
61. E.g., Reddick v. Carfield, 656 N.E.2d 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
62. E.g., Hagerman v. Metro-North Commuter R.Rt, No. 94 CIV. 5356, 1995 WL
614562 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995).
63. E.g., Arnold v. Ford, No. 01-A-01-9505-CV00203, 1995 VL 611280 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Oct. 19, 1995).
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cases,64 surprisingly few, given the current outcry over how the sup-
posed proliferation of such cases is affecting our nation.65 There
were only four medical malpractice cases,6 two legal malpractice
cases,67 and one veterinary malpractice case.6
One last observation: The day's lineup of cases was enriched
slightly by a technological glitch. The opinion in Bosley v. Kearney
R-1 School District69 was originally dated October 4, 1995. How-
ever, "[d]ue to some computer file errors, portions of the ... opin-
ion were omitted, and others were included which should have been
left out."'7° A new order was therefore substituted for the previous
one. The date of the final, revised opinion: October 19, 1995.
II. THE CASES
A. The Facts
From Mrs. Palsgraff's unfortunate encounter with the fireworks-
driven scales,7' to little Brian Dailey's prank of pulling the chair out
from under Ruth Garratt,72 to the lady who thought she could fly
because Batman could,73 facts make the world of torts go around.
On October 19, 1995, there was no shortage of interesting and unu-
sual fact patterns. The plaintiff in one case slipped and fell on what
appeared to be ice cream in a Wal-Mart store.74 A customer at an-
other store was injured when a stacked toilet paper display fell on
her.75 An elementary student was hit in the eye with a hockey
stick.76 Another plaintiff fell off a bridge.'77
Among the unusual fact patterns presented on October 19 were
the circumstances of Stratmeyer v. United States.78 The plaintiffs had
purchased fifty-two head of cattle, and commingled them with their
existing herd. Unknown to the plaintiffs, however, the purchased
cattle had been part of a herd exposed to brucellosis, a highly conta-
64. E.g., Hatch v. Maine Tank Co., 666 A.2d 90 (Me. 1995).
65. See, eg., Neil A. Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 1996, at Al.
66. E.g., Mitchell v. New Milford Hosp., No. CV 92 0060555, 1995 WL 631017
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 1995).
67. Mitchell v. Biomagnetic Resonance, Inc., No. 95-2076, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
35443 (6th Cir. Oct. 19, 1995); Johnson v. Hollon, No. 0125524, 1995 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2951 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 1995).
68. Stratmeyer v. United States, 67 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1995).
69. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
70. Id. at 1012.
71. Paisgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
72. Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
73. Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970).
74. Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 909 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
75. Lazzara v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 667 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
76. Garcia v. Kusan, Inc., 655 N.E.2d 1290 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
77. Sisk v. Williamson County, 657 N.E.2d 903 (I11. 995).
78. 67 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 49:111
A DAY IN THE LIFE
gious disease.79 Prior to the sale, state and federal veterinarians had
detected the brucellosis, and had taken some safety steps with re-
gard to the seller's herd. The federal veterinarian, however, knew
nothing about the subsequent sale, and played no part in it.' Under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the plaintiffs claimed that the United
States was liable for the veterinarian's negligence in failing to in-
spect the cattle, in failing to quarantine the entire exposed herd, and
for failing to warn prospective buyers about the brucellosis.81 The
Seventh Circuit held that the suit failed for lack of a duty owed to
the plaintiffs.P The duty owed by government veterinarians is a
duty owed to the public as a whole, according to the court, under
Indiana's public duty doctrine.' Absent the assumption of some
special relationship, for instance when a governmental actor makes
assurances that are relied upon by some individual, no duty flows to
particular individuals.' Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed
the district court's summary judgment in favor of the United
States.85
Many of the October 19 cases serve as a reflection of our times
and culture. In Franklin v. Village of Riverdale,'s the plaintiff al-
leged assault and battery arising out of her arrest at the scene of a
near-riot. The disturbance was accompanied by shouts of "Rodney
King" from the crowd.' Another case arose out of a gay rights pro-
test at an appearance by former President George Bush. s Other
cases involved sexual misconduct, both by adults' and children.91
Woodstock '94, the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of the origi-
nal rock festival, gave rise to a contract interference and defamation
case.
91
A sort of reverse liposuction for cattle was at the center of the
controversy in Galveston County Fair & Rodeo v. Kauffinan.92 The
young owner of a prize steer was stripped of his championship be-
cause of allegations that he injected air under the steer's hide to
79. Id. at 1342.
80. Id. at 1343.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1347.
83. Id. at 1344, 1347.
84. Id. at 1347.
85. Id at 1343, 1348.
86. No. 94 C 3983, 1995 WL 616678 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1995).
87. Id. at *2.
88. Lyons v. City of Lewiston, 666 A.2d 95 (Me. 1995).
89. See, eg., Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93 C 4397, 1995 WL 616685
(N.D. M11. Oct. 19,1995) (involving alleged sexual assault between fellow employees).
90. See, eg., Childers v. A.S., 909 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (involving
children playing "doctor").
91. Goldsmith v. Polygram Diversified Ventures Inc., No. 94 CIV. 888S, 1995 WL
614560 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995).
92. 910 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App. 1995, writ denied).
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improve its appearance, a process known as "airing."'93 The court's
opinion is full of delightful passages such as, "He [an expert] also
was troubled by the fact that the carcass was allowed to hang much
longer than usual due to the controversy, noting that if a carcass
hangs long enough, air bubbles begin to form from bacterial ac-
tion."94 The owner's father was ridiculed at work by his co-workers,
who called him "Air Kauffman."' Incidentally, the steer in ques-
tion was named "Reebok."96 However, and somewhat inexplicably,
the court never refers to the steer as "Air Reebok."'
Another unusual fact pattern was presented in Kleinert v. Kimball
Elevator Co.,98 or what we might call the Case of the Yo-Yo Eleva-
tor. Deanna Kleinert got on the elevator on the sixth floor. Forty
minutes later, she was still trapped inside. During that time, the ele-
vator "intermittently and erratically rose and fell"9 9 in a process an
elevator expert later referred to as "yo-yoing."' 10 Kleinert was
thrown around inside the elevator and injured. She finally escaped
by prying open the doors and jumping down to the floor below. 101
The appellate court reversed the trial court's directed verdict in
favor of the defendants, holding that there was sufficient evidence to
permit a finding of negligence. 10 2 For purposes of remand, the court
also held that the defendants should be held to the higher standard
of care applicable to common carriers: "[T]he risk presented when
transporting passengers vertically is as great as transporting passen-
gers horizontally in a conveyance such as a bus or train.' 10 3
One opinion wins the prize for the most bizarre case of the day.
The plaintiff in Anonymous v. Kaye' °4 was a graduate of Seton Hall
University School of Law who apparently wanted to remain, well,
anonymous. He proceeded pro se in a suit against seven judges of
the New York Court of Appeals, seven judges of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, and Seton Hall's Law School and its dean. He also
tried to sue the law school's trustees, leading the court to observe:
"While Plaintiff purports to sue the Trustees of Seton Hall Univer-
sity School of Law, the law school has no trustees."' 0 5 Plaintiff's
attempt to take the New York Bar Exam had been frustrated by
Seton Hall's refusal to issue the required certifications, because of a
93. Id. at 132. Not to be confused with "erring."
94. Id. at 134.
95. Id
96. Id. at 131.
97. Id. passim.
98. 905 P.2d 297 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
99. Id. at 298.
100. Id. at 299.
101. Id. at 298.
102. Id. at 300.
103. Id. at 301.
104. No. 94 Civ. 2882 (JFK), 1995 WL 617795 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995).
105. Id. at *6 n.3.
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residency deficiency arising out of plaintiffs having been disciplined
for plagiarism."0 6 The suit was based in part on a theory of defama-
tion. All of the defendants were successful in having the case dis-
missed on a variety of grounds.' 7
B. The Legal Issues and Opinions
The seventy-eight cases decided on October 19, 1995 spanned a
wide range of tort issues, as the following sampling of the opinions
indicates.
How does one define the significance of a case? Prestige of the
court? Cutting-edge issues of law? Magnitude of the injuries al-
leged? If any or all of these are appropriate criteria, then Jacobs v.
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.' may be the most significant case
decided on October 19, 1995. In that litigation, twenty-seven cases
were consolidated for the appeal.' 0 9 The plaintiffs had all been re-
cipients of the TMJ Interpositional Implant ("IPI"), an artificial car-
tilage replacement for the temporomandibular (jaw) joint ("TMJ").
The Du Pont teflon in the IPI was alleged to have caused a variety
of serious physical problems, including tumors, bone degeneration,
hearing loss, and facial paralysis." 0 The manufacturer/distributor of
the IPI had filed for bankruptcy,"' so Du Pont was apparently
targeted as the "deep pocket." The Sixth Circuit decided the case
against a backdrop of numerous other federal court decisions litigat-
ing the same claims." 2 Among the theories advanced by the plain-
tiffs were strict liability for defective design and failure to warn, and
negligent failure to test the teflon as used in the IpI.113 The court
affirmed the district courts' grants of summary judgment in favor of
Du Pont." 4 The court held that the state law claims were not pre-
empted by the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act;" that as a component part manufacturer, Du
Pont under Ohio law had no duty to warn end-users of the finished
product;1 6 and that even if there were a duty to warn, Du Pont was
entitled to rely on warnings it gave to the manufacturer/distributor,
under the "sophisticated intermediary" rule.1 7 The court con-
cluded with a dose of policy:
106. Id. at *1, *4.
107. Id passim (improper venue, lack of personal jurisdiction, and res judicata).
108. 67 F.3d 1219 (6th Cir. 1995).
109. Id. at 1222.
110. Id. at 1225.
111. Id. at 1224.
112. Id. at 1223 n.4.
113. Id. at 1222.
114. Id. at 1247.
115. Id. at 1234-36 (construing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994)).
116. Id. at 1236-38.
117. Id. at 1238-40.
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If we adhered to Appellants' theory, access to raw materials
like Teflon for entrepreneurs seeking new applications would
either disappear or be undermined by an inevitable increase in
price. This, of course, would stymie the kind of beneficial sci-
entific innovation which, sadly, did not take place here, but
which has occurred in many other areas of human
endeavor." 8
Oxley v. Sabine River Authority" 9 raised a common and intensely
practical problem inherent in modem tort law: the apportioning of
fault, by percentages, among multiple negligent parties. The plain-
tiff, a retired electrical worker, was severely burned when electricity
arced from a transformer at a construction site where he was provid-
ing a consultation. 2 ° The jury apportioned fault as follows: 25% to
the manufacturer of the transformer; 25% to the project's managing
agent; 25% to the local electric utility company; 10% to the state
agency responsible for the site; 10% to the seller of the transformer;
5% to the electrical subcontractor; and 0% to the plaintiff.'2' Vari-
ous parties contended on appeal that certain percentages assigned
were either too high or too low. In each instance, after recounting
the pertinent facts, the appellate court affirmed the jury's apportion-
ment.'2 The court observed, "When two permissible views of the
evidence exist, the jury's choice between them cannot be manifestly
erroneous."" The court indicated that it would have to find the
jury was "clearly wrong"'" 4 or had "manifestly or legally erred' 125
before it would make any change. As the court put it, "We are not
persuaded at this late stage in the proceedings to 'second guess' the
jury's fault assessments ....
Oxley also presented a couple of interesting damages issues. As a
result of the bums suffered by the plaintiff, the lower half of his right
leg had to be amputated and his left leg was rendered non-func-
tional; he was in the hospital for ninety-nine days, and had over
thirty surgical procedures. 27 The jury awarded $2,200,000 in gen-
eral damages, separate from an award of $875,000 for past and fu-
ture medical expenses.'" In upholding the jury's award, the
appellate court noted that in addition to his other injuries, the plain-
118. Id. at 1241.
119. 663 So. 2d 497 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
120. Id. at 501.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 503-07.
123. Id. at 503 (citing Stobart v. State Through Dep't. of Tansp. & Dev., 617 So.
2d 880 (La. 1993)).
124. Id. at 504.
125. Id. at 507.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 510.
128. Id. at 501.
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tiff suffered a complete loss of vision in one eye.129 Then, in a foot-
note, the court made one final observation that may have in fact
been very important to the jury: "Oxley was blind in one eye prior
to the accident." 130
How about $500,000 for loss of consortium? That was what the
jury awarded to the plaintiff's wife, Bessie Oxley.13" ' That's a lot of
consortium. On appeal the court upheld the award, paying "great
deference" to the jury's determination, which it emphasized is by
nature "highly subjective."'3 The court went on:
Mr. and Mrs. Oxley were planning to retire in the Toledo
Bend area, to spend the rest of their life fishing and enjoying
the pleasures that area has to offer. Obviously, as a result of
this accident, the Oxleys' plan for their "golden years" will not
materialize and their lives have been drastically altered.
While Mrs. Oxley testified their love for each other has re-
mained undaunted, their relationship as husband and wife has
changed to patient and nurse.133
The court noted that the award was the highest for loss of consor-
tium ever rendered in Louisiana.134
This same case gave rise to another opinion issued the same day.
In that companion case, the court addressed an insurance dispute
involving one of the defendants.135 Prior to the plaintiff's injury,
Utility Data Service ("UDS"), the manager on the construction pro-
ject, had asked its insurance agent to procure liability coverage with
limits of $600,000 per occurrence. The coverage actually obtained
only had a $300,000 limit.136 UDS sued the insurance agent for neg-
ligence, in an action the court characterized as "analogous to a mal-
practice claim brought against an attorney or a physician."'137
Because the complaint sounded in tort, the court held, it was barred
by a one-year limitations period."3
In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Aiello, 39 the court addressed the
novel question of how long an insurance company's duty of good
faith and fair dealing lasts. Stewart Title had refused to pay a claim
arising out of a cloud on the Aiellos' title, forcing litigation. That
suit was settled at the last minute by means of a stipulated judgment
129. Id. at 510.
130. Id. at 510 n2.
131. Id. at 510.
132. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 575 So. 2d 934 (La. Ct. App.
1991).
133. Id. at 511.
134. Id.
135. Oxley v. Sabine River Auth., 664 So. 2d 493 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
136. Id. at 495.
137. Id. (discussing Roger v. Defrene, 613 So. 2d 947 (La. 1993)).
138. Id.
139. 911 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
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against Stewart Title. 4 ° Thereafter, Stewart Title resisted collection
of the judgment by ignoring the plaintiffs' letters and phone calls,
and even by failing to appear when subpoenaed for depositions re-
garding collection of the judgment. 4' Finally, plaintiffs sued Stew-
art Title again, this time for the tort of bad faith. Stewart Title
argued that the bad faith claim must fail, because once the stipu-
lated judgment was entered, the relationship changed from a fiduci-
ary relationship between insurer and insured to a mere debtor-
creditor relationship. 4 The court held that the duty of good faith
survives, even after the entry of judgment, until all the relevant acts
arising out of the insurer-insured relationship are completed. 43 The
court thus upheld a judgment that had included $200,000 in exem-
plary damages.'"
In Hagerman v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,'45 a federal dis-
trict court made some interesting observations about the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. A railroad employee had
been required to submit to random drug screening. His urine sam-
ple tested positive, as did a follow-up sample. 46 The employee was
fired as a result. However, the testing lab refused to verify the re-
sult, and then lost the sample.' 47 The court recited the oft-quoted
Restatement standard, that actionable conduct must be "'so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community ' ", 48 and concluded,
"Neither the taking of the urine sample by Metro-North nor its sub-
sequent loss by Maryland constitutes the requisite outrageous con-
duct.' 149 In a footnote, the court commented on the "common law"
rule:
It is true that speaking of "the common law" in the singular
is often misleading because the common law is "emphatically
plural" and a common law rule that is consistent with the law
of one state will almost inevitably be inconsistent with the law
of another. In this case, however, the New York rule comports
with the Restatement position in requiring "outrageous" con-
duct. Moreover, the requirement of outrageous conduct for
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress appears to
140. Id. at 467.
141. Id. at 468.
142. Id. at 469-70.
143. Id. at 471.
144. Id. at 467, 473.
145. No. 94 CIV. 5356 (DLC), 1995 WL 614562 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995).
146. Id. at *1.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *2 (quoting RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
149. Id.
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present one of those rare instances in which the common law
is indeed, "emphatically singular."' 50
A somewhat unusual defense was offered by a familiar retailer in
Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores,'5' a case that arose in Mountain View,
Missouri. The plaintiff claimed she fell in a slippery store aisle, per-
haps due to spilled ice cream on the floor. 5 At trial, Wal-Mart
tried to introduce testimony from one of its employees regarding
that store's record for safety. Specifically, the proffered testimony
was that the Mountain View store had previously won the "Store of
the Year Safety Award."'153 The trial judge excluded the testi-
mony.154 The Court of Appeals affirmed: "'[E]vidence showing the
non-occurrence of other accidents is not competent to show that a
place where an accident occurred was reasonably safe and free from
danger.' 15 5
Medical malpractice litigation was represented on October 19 by
Flanagan v. Labe"56 In that case, the plaintiff claimed that his col-
lapsed lung and emphysema had worsened as a result of negligent
nursing care in the hospital."5 Although the trial court had allowed
plaintiff's expert witness, a registered nurse, to testify about the
standard of care required of nurses and the breach thereof, the court
refused her testimony on the issue of medical causation and diagno-
sis.' 58 Without evidence of causation, the plaintiff found himself on
the losing end of a summary judgment motion. 59 The Superior
Court affirmed, holding that because nurses are not statutorily au-
thorized to practice medicine, they are likewise "not authorized to
formulate medical diagnoses and [are] therefore not competent to
provide a jury with such formulations. ' ' 60
How about hedonic damages? On October 19, 1995, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky refused to recognize this trendy new form of
recovery:
150. Id. *2 n3 (citations omitted).
151. 909 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). More typically, the attempt would be
by the plaintiff to show that a store's prior experience with a continuing hazard put it
on notice of the risk, providing a basis for the liability. See Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 494 P.2d 839, 840-41 (Colo. 1972).
152. Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores, 909 S.W.2d at 729.
153. Id. at 734.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Gilbert v. Bluhm, 291 S.W.2d 125, 132 (Mo. 1956)). On Octo-
ber 19, 1995, Wal-Mart was in the hands of a jury in another tort case. See Lorraine
Blackwell, Wal-Mart Case Jury to Resume Deliberations, Ricwrom Tibms-Dms-
PATcH, Oct. 19, 1995, at B3 (defamation action by former employee).
156. 666 A.2d 333 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
157. Id. at 334.
158. Id. at 335.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 338.
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"The hedonic value of life refers to the value of the pleasure,
the satisfaction, or the 'utility' that human beings derive from
life, separate and apart from the labor or earnings value of life.
To determine the hedonic loss, we seek to measure the value
of human beings separate from the value of their output as
mere 'economic machines' ..... " This court recognizes that
there is measurable value to one's life other than his or her
earning capacity. However, this value is already recoverable
in the recognized category of mental suffering. There is no
need to allow for the recoupment of hedonic damages as a
separate category of loss.16
1
A Wisconsin appellate court explained the tort of intentional in-
terference with a prospective contract in Foseid v. State Bank. 62
"An individual improperly interferes with a prospective contract by
'(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or
continue [a] prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from
acquiring or continuing [a] prospective relation." 163 The court em-
phasized that the interference must be intentional, in the sense of a
"purpose" to interfere with the contract,'6 4 or at the very least with
knowledge to a substantial certainty that the interference would
occur.
165
One venerable doctrine of the tort law came under attack in
Lockhart v. List."6 The case arose out of an automobile accident
that had happened over nine years earlier, in 1986. Alix Lockhart
had driven through a series of "S-curves," and had just come around
the final bend to find the defendant's garbage truck blocking her
lane of travel. 67 She was unable to brake in time to avoid hitting
the truck. In the subsequent lawsuit, the defendant argued that
Lockhart herself had been negligent for failing to stop her car within
the "assured clear distance ahead."' 16 Lockhart in response argued
that she should not be held to the usual negligence standard, be-
cause under the sudden emergency doctrine, she had been faced
with an unexpected peril which permitted little or no opportunity
for reasoned action. 69 The trial court, however, refused to instruct
the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine, which it called "bogus"
and a "confusing malignant mutation of our jurisprudence.' 170 In
161. Adams v. Miller, 908 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Ky. 1995) (citations omitted).
162. 541 N.W.2d 203 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
163. Id. at 209 (quoting Cudd v. Crownhart, 364 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Wis. Ct. App.
1985)).
164. Id. But the intent need not be "malicious," nor show "ill will." Id. at 210
n.10.
165. Id. at 210 n.11.
166. 665 A.2d 1176 (Pa. 1995).
167. Id. at 1178.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1180.
170. Id. at 1178 n.1.
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reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not comment di-
rectly on the trial court's views, except to say that the sudden emer-
gency doctrine "has been recognized in Pennsylvania since 1854 and
has most assuredly survived the advent of comparative negligence in
this Commonwealth."''
Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School District" gives us a brief glimpse
into the difficult and sometimes frustrating life of the trial judge. In
that case, which involved allegations of sexual harassment, the de-
fendants moved for summary judgment. In response to the motion
and its statement of facts, the plaintiffs wrote, "Plaintiffs do not disa-
gree to any material extent with the statement of undisputed
facts."' 7 3 This created some confusion for Judge Bartlett: "It be-
came clear, however, in plaintiffs' argument and affidavits that they
do in fact disagree with some of the facts set forth by the defendant.
Plaintiffs' admission on one hand and implicit denial on the other
created a dilemma: which do the plaintiffs intend for me to act
upon?"' 74
An appellate court in another October 19 case reported the fol-
lowing incident involving a frustrated trial judge:
During the trial of this medical malpractice case, the trialjudge became impatient with the bickering between counsel,
and humorously threatened to lock them in a closet filled with
weapons so they could settle their disputes. The two isolated
comments in this vein were addressed to both counsel, were
not objected to by either side, and did not prejudice
plaintiffs.'75
Common sense is alive and well, at least in some courts. In Kane
v. R.D. Werner Co. 76 an Illinois appellate court held that a products
liability suit based on inadequate warning labels (on a ladder) must
fail, because the injured plaintiff admitted that he never read the
warning labels. "[S]ince plaintiff failed to read the warning labels,
the alleged inadequate content of those warnings could not have
proximately caused his injuries .... "177
IV. CONCLUSION
I close with a few parting observations of a miscellaneous and
somewhat personal nature. I appreciate the judges who managed to
build some creativity into the wording of their opinions. For exam-
ple, one judge talked of the plaintiff having been "hoodwinked" by
171. Id. at 1183 n.7.
172. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
173. Id. at 1014.
174. Id. at 1014-15.
175. Alonso v. Powers, 632 N.Y.S.2d 551, 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
176. 657 N.E.2d 37 (IlL App. Ct. 1995).
177. Id. at 39.
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the defendant.' 78 Another court spoke of a party's "skulldug-
gery."' 79 Another opinion resisted the temptation to engage in
what it called "appellate tinkering,"' 10 and characterized the de-
fendants' arguments as "hollow cries."'' A federal district court
judge lamented that he was faced with "a slew of motions."'" My
favorite? The judge who referred to the sudden emergency doctrine
as "bogus" and a "confusing malignant mutation of our
jurisprudence."'8 3
On a more substantive note, the Restatement remains a favorite
source of authority for courts writing tort opinions. At least eleven
of the October 19 opinions cited to and relied on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.' 4
In a perverse sort of way, I admire the spunk of the defendants in
Renz v. 33rd District Agricultural Association.' The plaintiffs had
complained about the noise and fumes connected with the defend-
ant's nearby motorcycle races. In response, the defendant assured
the plaintiffs that it was "working on" the problem.' 6 Defendant
then raised its noise limit to make the motorcycle races even
louder.' 7 A nuisance action resulted.18
Some of the major corporate players in our country were involved
as defendants in these tort cases, including Wal-Mart,'189 Du Pont, 190
Georgia-Pacific,' 9 ' Mobil Oil,"9  and General Motors (two
cases!). 93 The biggest defendant of the day? The United States of
America. 94 The tastiest defendant of the day? Sara Lee!'95
178. City Bank & Trust Co. v. Vann (In re Vann), 67 F.3d 277, 279 (11th Cir.
1995).
179. Stratmeyer v. United States, 67 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995).
180. Oxley v. Sabine River Auth., 663 So. 2d 497, 507 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
181. Id. at 509.
182. Anonymous v. Kaye, No. 94 CIV. 2882 (JFK), 1995 WL 617795 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 1995).
183. Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1178 n.1 (Pa. 1995). See supra text accom-
panying notes 166-71.
184. E.g., Jamar v. Patterson, 910 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. App. 1995) (citing RE.
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. c (1965)).
185. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
186. Id. at 68.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 909 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). See
supra text accompanying notes 151-55.
190. Jacobs v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 67 F.3d 1219 (6th Cir. 1995).
191. Leaf River Forest Prod., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648 (Miss. 1995).
192. 325-343 E. 56th St. Corp. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 906 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C.
1995).
193. Bellia v. General Motors Corp., No. 68489, 1995 WL 614509 (Ohio Ct. App.
Oct. 19, 1995); Golla v. General Motors Corp., 657 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. 1995).
194. Stratmeyer v. United States, 67 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1995).
195. J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., No. CIV.A.93-4050, 1995 WL 619770
(E.D. La. Oct. 19, 1995).
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I marveled at the plaintiff who received $45,000 from a jury for
slipping on ice cream. 96 I felt sorry for the plaintiff who received
an award of $4.62 million at trial, only to see it reduced to zero on
appeal.197
If I am ever a party in a tort case,198 I know who I want for my
lawyer: Mr. Keaton, of the law firm of Keaton & Keaton, P.C.'99
All of this, and more, in a single day's worth of tort cases. It is no
wonder that those of us who teach and practice in the tort field
never tire of its rich variety.
196. Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 909 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
197. Fisher Controls Int'l, Inc. v. Gibbons, 911 S.W.2d 135, 137-38 (Tex. App.
1995).
198. Cf. Douglas H. Cook, How I Spent my Sabbatical, or What Happens When a
Torts Professor is a Juror in a Negligence Case, 14 REv. Lmo. 219, 246 n.44 (1995).
199. Reddick v. Carfield, 656 N.E2d 518 (Ind. C. App. 1995). Cf. PAcE KE.E-
TON & ROBERT E. KEETON, KEETON & KEETON'S CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS
(2d ed. 1977).
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